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Abstract 
This paper investigates the evolution and structure of wage inequality among adult male workers 
engaged  in  regular  and  casual  wage  employment  in  India  during  a  period  of  radical  economic 
change.  The  analysis  exploits  data  from  nationally  representative  employment  surveys  and  uses 
decomposition  techniques  to  examine  the  role  played  by  educational  achievement  and  industry 
affiliation. This paper finds that there are striking differences for the two groups of workers. Wage 
inequality rose between 1983 and 1999 among regular workers but fell among casual workers. While 
human capital (as embodied in age and education) is one of the major factors explaining both the 
level of and change in regular wage inequality, geographic location is the key determinant of casual 
wage inequality. Industry affiliation plays an equally important role for both sets of workers. These 
are also consistently the most important contributors to changes in inequality though the directional 
effects differ among the different sets of workers.. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The  late  1980s  and  1990s  were  a  period  of  rapid  industrial  deregulation  and  trade 
liberalisation  in  India.  External  sector  reforms  included  the  market  determination  of  the 
exchange rate, tariffication of quantitative restrictions and their subsequent reduction, export 
promotion and the establishment of export processing zones and the removal of restrictions on 
inflows  of  foreign  capital.  Industrial  policy  reforms  were  initiated  in  the  mid-1980s  with 
respect to industrial licensing regulations, the role of public sector enterprises, large firms and 
foreign direct investment. Labour market regulations such as the Industrial Disputes Act that 
prevent  closure  of  units  and  the  lay-off  of  workers  without  prior  government  approval, 
however, were not brought under the liberalisation agenda until 2001 (see Nouroz (2001) and 
Kapila (2001)  for a detailed review). The decade of the 1990s was also one when India 
seemed to fulfil its  growth potential,  growing  at an  average of six to  seven per  cent per 
annum. There is some evidence that this process of economic change was accompanied by 
rising wage inequality among workers in the organised manufacturing sector (see Galbraith et 
al.  (2004)).  The  primary  motivation  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  the  structure  of  wage 
inequality in India during this period of radical economic change, with a particular focus on 
the  role  played  by  education  and  industry  affiliation.  This  paper  exploits  three  national 
employment surveys for the years 1983, 1993-94 and 1999-2000 - the first survey can be 
interpreted  as  providing  insights  into  the  structure  of  Indian  labour  markets  prior  to 
liberalisation while the latter two provide the basis for delineating a portrait of these structures 
after the liberalisation process.  
 
Several  studies  have  documented  rising  wage  inequality  between  skilled  and  unskilled 
workers  in  developed  countries,  particularly  the  United  States  and  United  Kingdom,  and 
developing countries, particularly Latin American countries, since the 1980s (see Katz and 
Autor (1999) and Wood (1997) for a review). The explanations put forward to account for this 
rising wage gap include institutional factors (such as changes in government policy), supply-
side  factors  (such  as  demographic  shifts  and  immigration  rates)  as  well  as  demand-side 
factors  (such  as  changes  in  the  relative  demand  for  skilled  labour  due  to  the  rise  in 
international trade and skill-biased technological change) (see Machin (2002)). While these 
explanations apply to changes in wage inequality in general, in practice, empirical studies 
examine almost exclusively the changes in the skill premia (proxied by education) and/or   3
inter-industry wage differentials. The contribution of these two factors to wage inequality in 
India is the focus of the current paper.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section describes our characterisation of the 
Indian labour market in terms of a dual labour market framework, i.e., the wage distributions 
of workers engaged in regular and casual wage employment are examined separately rather 
than conflating them into one category. Section 3 examines the trends in wage inequality for 
both regular and casual workers. There are relatively few estimates of wage inequality for 
India.  A  simple  accounting  approach  is  used  to  decompose  overall  wage  inequality  into 
inequality between and within population sub-groups, with the groups defined by education (a 
proxy for skill) and industry affiliation. Lastly, an alternative decomposition is undertaken 
that examines the contribution of various explanatory variables to the level of and change in 
wage inequality within a regression-based framework following Fields (2002). Augmented 
Mincerian wage equations are estimated for regular and casual workers separately using a set 
of human capital measures and a variety of worker, industry and state characteristics after 
correcting for the presence of selection bias. The estimates from these regression models are 
used in the Fields’ decomposition. Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
 
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, this study adds to our understanding of the 
evolution and structure of inequality in India. There are almost no comprehensive empirical 
studies  of  trends  in  wage  inequality  for  India  with  the  work  of  Galbraith  et  al.  (2004) 
providing  one  notable  exception.  However,  Galbraith  et  al.  compute  inequality  measures 
using  grouped  data  (grouped  by  industry  and  by  industry  and  state)  relating  to  earnings 
(calculated  as  the  annual  wage  bill  divided  by  the  number  of  workers)  in  the  organised 
manufacturing  sector.  This  paper,  on  the  other  hand,  computes  wage  inequality  measures 
using  data  on  individual  wage  rates  for  all  workers  engaged  in  regular  or  casual  wage 
employment  in  all  economic  sectors  including  agriculture,  organised  and  unorganised 
manufacturing  and  services.  Second,  this  study  augments  the  growing  literature  on  the 
empirical application of a regression-based decomposition technique in order to examine the 
significance and contribution of various factors to wage inequality. At the same time it should 
be stressed that this paper is essentially an accounting exercise and there is no attempt to 
examine the reasons for the change in the underlying factors, such as the returns to education 
or industry affiliation, that contributed to the change in wage inequality during this period.   4
However, by examining in detail the structure of wage inequality for different sets of workers 
this paper sets the stage for a future investigation of these links.  
 
2. The informal economy: regular-casual worker dichotomy  
 
The dual labour market model supposes the existence of two distinct sectors of economic 
activity  usually  classified  as  the  organised  and  unorganised  sectors.  The  organised  sector 
offers  more  stable  jobs  with  higher  pay,  better  working  conditions  and  promotional 
opportunities whereas the unorganised sector is associated with unstable jobs and low or even 
flat  returns  to  schooling,  poor  pay,  bad  working  conditions  and  few  opportunities  for 
advancement (Dickens and Lang (1985); Taubman and Wachter (1986)). Thus the dual labour 
market  approach  argues  that  there  are  two  distinct  types  of  jobs  with  separate  wage 
determination processes. 
 
Unni (2001, pp. 2361) argues that the notion of an “informal economy” that characterises 
workers “depending on the degree of informality of their work status” is more relevant for 
examining wage structures. Similarly, Tendulkar (2003) and Das (2003) argue that in the 
Indian context the organised-unorganised dichotomy generally used to analyse labour market 
outcomes  is  better  represented  using  a  typology  reflecting  the  employment  status  of  the 
individual. There are two reasons why this is a desirable strategy. First, the National Sample 
Surveys  (NSS)  do  not  report  whether  the  individual  is  employed  in  the  organised  or 
unorganised sector;
2 they do however report whether the worker has a regular or casual job or 
is self-employed, unemployed or not participating in the labour market. The 1999 survey 
reported data on the type of enterprise that can be used to classify it as belonging to the 
organised or unorganised sector. This classification reveals that about 57 per cent of regular 
workers  were  employed  in  enterprises  that  were  public,  semi-public  or  otherwise  in  the 
registered or organised sector but only 10 per cent of casual workers were so employed.   
 
Second, in the dual labour market literature workers in the unorganised sector are engaged in 
economic activities with low productivity resulting in low incomes, less stable employment 
                                                 
2 The organised sector covers those enterprises registered under the Factory Act (1948), i.e., all establishments 
that employ ten or more workers and use power as well as those that employ 20 or more workers but do no use 
power.   5
contracts (this includes the self employed) and fewer social security benefits. There is an 
increasing awareness that the type of work contract is a better indicator of the informality of 
an  individual' s  employment  rather  than  whether  or  not  the  workplace  is  in  the  organised 
sector. For instance, a worker with a temporary contract with no provisions for social security 
should be considered as belonging to the unorganised sector even though he works in a large 
factory. In the Indian context this translates directly into the regular-casual worker dichotomy. 
Regular wage employment is often considered to be the most preferred category of work 
(Das,  2003).  Tendulkar  (2003,  p.  2)  refers  to  "workers  having  regular,  contractual  hired 
employment"  as  the  "labour  aristocracy  because  of  the  privileged  service  conditions  this 
segment enjoys including high wages". Though these high wages reflect at least in part the 
returns to the higher skill endowments of these workers, redundancy (especially in the public 
sector) suggests the presence of rents. Regular workers are also covered by labour market 
regulations that confer some measure of employment security and social security benefits. 
Casual workers can be considered a subset of the informal labour market - they are generally 
engaged in economic activity with low wages, unstable employment contracts and little or no 
social  security  benefits.  This  is  the  approach  followed  in  this  paper  -  regular  wage 
employment  is  taken  as  analogous  to  the  ‘primary  labour  market’  and  casual  wage 
employment to the ‘secondary labour market’ in the dual labour market literature.
3  
 
3. Wage inequality in India 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper uses data drawn from nationally representative large-scale 
employment surveys undertaken by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) during  
January-December 1983, July 1993–June 1994 and July 1999–June 2000 (referred to as 1983, 
1993 and 1999 in this paper).
4 The sample is restricted to prime age males aged between 15 
and 65 years (see the data appendix for details). The trends in wage dispersion among regular 
and casual workers are examined using a number of inequality measures including percentile 
ratios, the Gini coefficient and three Generalised Entropy measures – the mean log deviation 
(MLD), the Theil index and half the squared coefficient of variation.  
 
                                                 
3 There is no attempt in this paper to formally test segmentation between the two types of wage employment (see 
Heckman  and  Hotz  (1986)  for  a  comprehensive  critique  of  the  inadequacy  of  tests  for  labour  market 
segmentation).  
4 The employment survey for 1987-88 could not be used as over 76% of observations on rural wages for persons 
participating in wage employment are missing.   6
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where n is the number of individuals in the sample,  w  is the arithmetic mean wage,  wi is the 
income of individual i, and wj is the income of individual j. 



































GE                           (2) 
where  a   is  a  parameter  that  represents  the  weight  given  to  distances  between  wages  at 
different parts of the wage distribution, and can take any real value. The most commonly used 
values of a  are 0, 1 and 2. A value of a  = 0 gives more weight to distances between wages 
in the lower tail,  a  = 1 applies equal weights across the distribution, while a value of  a  = 2 
gives proportionately more weight to gaps in the upper tail. The GE measures with parameters 
0 and 1 become, with l' Hopital' s rule, two of Theil’s measures of inequality, the mean log 
deviation (GE(0) or MLD) and the Theil index (GE(1)) respectively, and with parameter 2 
becomes  half  the  squared  coefficient  of  variation  (referred  to  as  GE(2)  here)  (Litchfield, 
2003). 
 
The  inequality  measures  reported  in  Table  1  are  computed  for  real  hourly  wages.
5  The 
standard  errors  are  computed  by  bootstrapping  with  1000  replications  and  95  per  cent 
confidence intervals constructed around these bootstrapped estimates are also reported. The 
statistical significance of changes in the point estimates of inequality measures over time can 
be examined using these confidence intervals. Cowell (1995)  provides formulae to calculate 
the  standard  errors  for  the  Gini  coefficient  and  GE(2)  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
underlying distribution are normal (provided the sample size is large). As the data reveal that 
the  wage  distribution  approximates  a  lognormal  rather  than  a  normal  distribution  the 
bootstrapping approach was used.  
 
                                                 
5 Inequality measures computed for real weekly wages are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix and reveal a 
similar picture of wage inequality.    7
 
 
Table 1: Measures of wage inequality  
  Regular workers   Casual workers  
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Mean real hourly wage (Rs.)  3.1077  4.4056  5.7747  1.0819  1.4381  1.7419 
  (2.71)  (3.37)  (5.36)  (0.77)  (0.73)  (0.93) 
Median real hourly wage (Rs.)  2.6042  3.6662  4.4708  0.9197  1.2840  1.5577 
Population share (%)  48.67  49.99  47.80  51.33  50.01  52.20 
Income share (%)  73.14  75.66  75.24  26.86  24.34  24.76 
Mean wage by education:             
Completed primary school  2.2813  2.7596  3.4419  1.2547  1.6012  1.8956 
Completed middle school  2.6743  3.2265  3.9571  1.3118  1.6726  1.9597 
Completed secondary school  3.8915  4.6547  5.9684  1.4042  1.6182  2.0036 
Completed graduate school  5.7181  7.1968  9.5482  1.6344  1.5361  2.0918 
Ratio graduate to primary wage  2.5065  2.6079  2.7741  1.3027  0.9593  1.1035 
Wage inequality measures:             
Inter-quantile range (90-10)  4.9054  7.4567  10.3043  1.2669  1.6470  1.9391 
Standard error  (0.0408)  (0.0541)  (0.0823)  (0.0151)  (0.0138)  (0.0131) 












Inter-quantile range (90-50)  3.0917  4.9059  7.1684  0.8757  1.0777  1.2664 
Standard error  (0.0387)  (0.0517)  (0.0766)  (0.0142)  (0.0126)  (0.0122) 












Inter-quantile range (50-10)  1.8138  2.5507  3.1359  0.3912  0.5693  0.6726 
Standard error  (0.0116)  (0.0225)  (0.0383)  (0.0042)  (0.0056)  (0.0053) 












Gini coefficient  0.3937  0.3923  0.4293  0.2920  0.2644  0.2629 
Standard error  (0.0021)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0022)  (0.0013)  (0.0013) 
[0.3896,  [0.3890,  [0.4253,  [0.2878,  [0.2619,  [0.2602,  Confidence interval 
0.3978]  0.3955]  0.4332]  0.2963]  0.2670]  0.2655] 
Mean log deviation, GE(0)  0.2855  0.3136  0.3369  0.1431  0.1524  0.117 
Standard error  (0.0029)  (0.0032)  (0.0032)  (0.0025)  (0.0026)  (0.0013) 
[0.2797,  [0.3073,  [0.3307,  [0.1382,  [0.1473,  [0.1145,  Confidence interval 
0.2913]  0.3199]  0.3431]  0.1479]  0.1575]  0.1195] 
Theil index, GE(1)  0.2743  0.2561  0.314  0.1585  0.1199  0.1186 
Standard error  (0.0041)  (0.0025)  (0.0052)  (0.0055)  (0.0013)  (0.0017) 
[0.2663,  [0.2512,  [0.3038,  [0.1478,  [0.1174,  [0.1153,  Confidence interval 
0.2823]  0.2610]  0.3243]  0.1693]  0.1224]  0.1220] 
Half squared coeff. variation, GE(2)  0.3811  0.2927  0.4303  0.2531  0.1287  0.1424 
Standard error  (0.0122)  (0.0054)  (0.0292)  (0.0363)  (0.0016)  (0.0052) 
[0.3573,  [0.2822,  [0.3730,  [0.1818,  [0.1255,  [0.1322,  Confidence interval 
0.4050]  0.3032]  0.4876]  0.3243]  0.1320]  0.1526] 
Sample size  27,356  26,387  27,295  28,855  26,398  29,805 
Note: Real hourly wage (Rs.) in constant 1983 prices. The inequality measures are computed without applying 
household weights (the results are very similar with weights). Figures in parentheses are as labelled - standard 
deviation for the mean wage, standard errors and 95% confidence intervals for inequality measures obtained by 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications.    8
 
The distribution of real hourly wages is approximately lognormal and positively skewed as 
suggested  from  the  difference  in  the  mean  and  median  wage.  Though  regular  workers 
comprise roughly half of all wage workers their wage share is about three-quarters. The wage 
gap between casual and regular workers is substantial and increased during this period - in 
1983 an average casual worker in the labour market earned about 35 per cent of the hourly 
wage earned by an average regular worker; by 1999 this had fallen to 30 per cent (see also 
Dubey et al. (2004)). The dispersion of wages among casual workers is much lower than that 
among regular workers - for instance, the inter-quantile range in 1983 was 1.27 for the former 
and  4.91  for  the  latter.  It  should  be  noted  that  these  summary  statistics  and  inequality 
measures are computed after trimming the wage distribution (see the Data Appendix). These 
estimates  of  wage  inequality,  however,  are  uncorrected  for  differences  in  observable 
individual and job characteristics that determine wages.  
 
Trends in the wage inequality measures over time are examined using confidence intervals 
(Litchfield, 2003). The Gini coefficient for regular workers is stable between 1983 and 1993 
at about 0.393 and rises to 0.429 in 1999. Inequality trends according to the Generalised 
Entropy measures depend on the measure used because of the different weighting given to 
different parts of the wage distribution. The mean log deviation reveals that inequality among 
regular workers rose in both periods while the other two measures reveal a fall during the first 
period followed by a rise in the second. Overall, the data indicate that wage inequality among 
regular workers has risen between 1983 and 1999. This pattern is reversed for casual workers 
though there is some disagreement among the different measures. The inter-quantile range 
rose in both sub-periods but the Gini coefficient and Theil index fell between 1983 and 1993 
before stabilising during the 1990s. The mean log deviation measure was stable in the first 
sub-period but fell during the 1990s. In contrast, the coefficient of variation rose between 
1993 and 1999 after a sharp fall in the first sub-period. Overall the picture is one of declining 
inequality among casual workers between 1983 and 1999. The differences in the inequality 
measures suggest that the changes in both the regular and casual wage distribution occurred at 
the tails of the distribution; measures such as the coefficient of variation and the three inter-
quantile ranges that are more sensitive to the tails reveal a rise in inequality during the 1990s. 
The trends in the wage gap between workers with graduate and primary schooling are similar 
to those in wage inequality.  
   9
These opposing trends in wage inequality for regular and casual workers are confirmed by a 
comparison of the disaggregated distributions using Lorenz curves (plots of the cumulated 
wage share against the cumulated population share) (see Figure A1 of the Appendix). These 
reveal that, for regular workers, the wage distribution for 1983 Lorenz dominates that for 
1999 – i.e., the Lorenz curve of this distribution lies nowhere below and at least somewhere 
above the 1999 distribution indicating that inequality was unambiguously lower in the first 
year. The pattern for casual workers is exactly the opposite with the 1999 distribution Lorenz 
dominating the 1983 distribution.  
 
As mentioned earlier, there are few estimates for wage inequality in India though several 
studies employ casual empiricism to suggest rising inequality during the 1990s. For instance, 
Acharyya  and  Marjit  (2000)  use  data  on  the  minimum  daily  wages  for  the  lowest  paid 
unskilled workers in the organised sector for the periods 1985-86 and 1993-94 to illustrate the 
widening gap between the minimum and maximum wage from about 0.48 in 1985-86 to 2.56 
in  1993-94.  To  the  author’s  knowledge,  only  one  other  study  (Galbraith  et  al.,  2004) 
constructs measures of pay inequality for the organised manufacturing sector in India. The 
construction of the wage measure is not specified. However, it is safe to assume that it is the 
product wage (i.e., total emoluments per employee or total wages per worker) as the data are 
obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) datasets. It appears that the wage data 
are expressed in nominal terms, though this is not explicit in the paper. The authors construct 
between-component Theil indices using grouped data (grouped by three-digit industry cells at 
the all-India level or two-digit industry cells at the state level) for the period 1972 to 1998. 
They document an increase in pay inequality in the organised Indian manufacturing since the 
early  1980s,  with  particular  increases  in  the  1990s.  This  increase  is  driven  primarily  by 
increases in inequality between industry groups (nationally and within states) rather than by 
regional inequality. It should be noted, however, that these trends are in regard to movements 
in wage inequality in the organised manufacturing sector only. To the extent that there are 
inter-linkages  between  manufacturing,  agriculture  and  services,  these  trends  in  wage 
inequality in organised manufacturing provide some notion of the developments in the rest of 
the economy. Given the large share of regular workers in manufacturing the trends in wage 
dispersion among these workers parallels those reported in other studies.  
 
The trend in wage inequality among regular workers also mirrors that for the consumption 
Gini coefficients computed from the consumption surveys (companion to the employment   10
surveys used in this research) – this Gini coefficient is relatively stable at 0.32 in 1983 and 
1993 and rising to 0.38 in 1997 (Datt, 1999; Özler et al., 1996). Various studies have found 
that this remained relative stable between 1961 and 1993 (Deaton and Dreze, 2002; Panda, 
1999). There is some debate about household inequality trends during the 1990s due to the 
changes in the 1999-2000 consumption survey that render comparison with previous years 
difficult (notably, the change in the recall period – see Deaton and Dreze (2002) for details). 
After correcting for these changes, the data suggest that household inequality has risen overall 
- the variance of log per capita expenditure increased from 0.29 in 1993 to 0.32 in 1999 (the 
unadjusted data reveals no change at 0.29) (Deaton and Dreze, 2002).  
 
It is also useful to place the findings of this paper in the context of wage inequality estimates 
for other countries. It should be noted that these comparisons should be treated as  indicative  
due  to  differences  in  data  sources,  samples  used,  time  coverage  and  the  measurement  of 
wages. In particular, the Indian estimates refer to the male wage distribution only while the 
others refer to all wage workers. Galbraith et al. (2000) demonstrate using UNIDO industrial 
statistics spanning a period between 1973 and 1997 that inequality in manufacturing pay is 
lowest among Australia, China, most European countries and Taiwan; next highest in Korea, 
Japan,  North  American  countries  and  some  middle-income  developing  countries;  and  the 
highest in Africa, Latin America, Russia and South Asia. In addition, they find that inequality 
in South Asia has risen during this period.  
 
The estimates of wage  inequality reported in this paper are  comparable with some Asian 
countries  for  which  data  are  available.  Wage  inequality  in  Vietnam,  undergoing  rapid 
economic change from a centrally planned socialist to a market-oriented economy, fell during 
the 1990s – the Gini coefficient fell from 0.40 to 0.38 between 1993 and 1998 (Gallup, 2002). 
The Republic of Korea also experienced declining wage inequality between 1976 and 1993 
with the Gini falling from approximately 0.40 to 0.30 (Fields and Yoo, 2000). Information on 
wage inequality in South Asian countries that are at a similar level of development as India is 
scarce. Mujeri (2002) reports that the ratio of unskilled to skilled wage in Bangladesh fell 
from 0.88 in 1985 to 0.69 in 1996. Comparable estimates for Indian male workers are: 0.64, 
0.88 and 0.77 for 1983, 1993 and 1999 for male casual workers and 0.32, 0.34 and 0.32 in the 
three years for male regular workers (where unskilled workers are defined as those with no 
education and skilled workers as graduates). The stability of this ratio for regular workers 
suggests that the rise in the wage inequality measures occurred at the middle of the wage   11
distribution rather than at the tails. These ratios for India and Bangladesh cannot be compared 
precisely as the division of workers into skilled and unskilled categories is unclear in the 
latter. In contrast, wage inequality in India is higher than that prevailing in developed and 
some formerly socialist  European countries but lower than that in the United States and 
Colombia. Transition economies such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia experienced rising wage inequality between 1989 and 1997 with the Gini coefficient 
ranging from 0.20 to 0.33. Others such as Bulgaria and Russia had higher levels of wage 
inequality (Newell, 2001). Blau and Kahn (1996) report a standard deviation of log hourly 
wages for ten industrialised European countries, including France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, around the mid- to late-1980s of 0.48; the corresponding figure for the United 
States  is  0.77.  Attanasio  et  al.  (2004)  report  standard  deviation  of  log  hourly  wages  for 
Colombia ranging from 0.77 to 0.89 between 1984 and 1998. The corresponding figures for 
all male wage workers, regular and casual, in India is 0.50 in 1983, rising to 0.57 and 0.62 in 
1993 and 1999.  
 
3.1. Decomposing inequality by education and industry 
 
The contribution of educational achievement and industry affiliation to wage inequality can 
be  examined  by  decomposing  the  inequality  measures  reported  above  into  within-  and 
between-group inequality components (see Cowell (1995) for the methodology and Litchfield 
(2003) for an application to Brazil). The partitions are those used in the subsequent wage 
regression models – 5 education groups (no education, those who have completed primary, 
middle, secondary and graduate school) and 38 industry groups.  
 
Any of the Generalised Entropy class of measures can be decomposed by population sub-
group so that the overall inequality (I) can be separated into within-group (Iw) and between-
group (Ib) inequality as follows (Cowell and Jenkins, 1995): 
b w I I I + =                                 (3) 
 
Within-group inequality is defined as a weighted sum of inequality within each of the sub-
groups where the weights are population shares, relative wages or some combination of these 













j j j f v ,  fj is the population share and vj the wage share of each group j (j=1,2,..k). 
Between-group inequality is computed by assuming each group member receives the mean 
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The fraction of inequality “explained” by differences between population sub-groups is then 
given by Rb = Ib / I  while the remainder is the unexplained component. The Gini coefficient 
can only be decomposed under the special circumstance when the groups are non-overlapping 
(i.e., each individual’s income in one group is greater/lower than each individual in the other 
groups). Due to the differences in the sensitivity to different parts of the wage distribution and 
in  the  weights  used  to  summarise  within-group  inequality  the  percentage  explained  by 
characteristics differ according to the GE measure used.  
 
The decomposition of the mean log deviation, Theil index and coefficient of variation into 
wage inequality between and within education groups is reported in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Decomposition of wage inequality by education level 
   1983  1993  1999 
Education level  GE(0)  GE(1)  GE(2)  GE(0)  GE(1)  GE(2)  GE(0)  GE(1)  GE(2) 
Regular workers:                   
Overall wage inequality   0.2855  0.2743  0.3811  0.3136  0.2561  0.2927  0.3369  0.3140  0.4303 
Within-group inequality  0.2025  0.1901  0.2915  0.2360  0.1794  0.2136  0.2525  0.2310  0.3447 
Contribution (%)  (70.92)  (69.30)  (76.49)  (75.24)  (70.04)  (72.98)  (74.94)  (73.54)  (80.11) 
Between-group inequality  0.0830  0.0842  0.0896  0.0776  0.0767  0.0791  0.0844  0.0831  0.0856 
Contribution (%)  (29.08)  (30.70)  (23.51)  (24.75)  (29.96)  (27.02)  (25.06)  (26.46)  (19.89) 
Casual workers:                   
Overall wage inequality   0.1431  0.1585  0.2531  0.1524  0.1199  0.1287  0.117  0.1186  0.1424 
Within-group inequality  0.1376  0.1528  0.2471  0.1486  0.1160  0.1247  0.1128  0.1144  0.1381 
Contribution (%)  (96.13)  (96.41)  (97.62)  (97.47)  (96.72)  (96.92)  (96.41)  (96.46)  (96.99) 
Between-group inequality  0.0055  0.0057  0.0060  0.0038  0.0039  0.0040  0.0042  0.0042  0.0043 
Contribution (%)  (3.84)  (3.62)  (2.37)  (2.50)  (3.25)  (3.11)  (3.57)  (3.58)  (3.03) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the contribution (%) of each component to overall inequality.  
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The results reveal that the major portion of wage inequality, particularly for casual workers, is 
accounted for by inequality among individuals within education groups rather than between 
individuals with different education levels. This is despite the rise in the returns to graduate 
education for regular workers (see Table A2 of the Appendix and the discussion below). The 
between-group component is very small in the case of casual workers possibly because only 
the majority of these  workers have no education or, at most, are educated up to primary 
school. The mean wages in each sub-group (see Table 1) are steadily increasing in education 
level but are clustered close to the overall mean. For regular workers, however, mean wages 
are increasing with wide variations around the overall mean, especially for graduates.  
 
The GE inequality measures are also decomposed into wage inequality between and within 38 
industry groups in Table 3. As before, the within-industry group component accounts for over 
three-quarters of wage inequality for regular workers and more than 80 per cent of wage 
inequality for casual workers.   
 
Table 3: Decomposition of wage inequality by industry groups 
   1983  1993  1999 
Industry group  GE(0)  GE(0)  GE(1)  GE(2)  GE(1)  GE(2)  GE(0)  GE(1)  GE(2) 
Regular workers:                   
Overall wage inequality   0.2855  0.2743  0.3811  0.3136  0.2561  0.2927  0.3369  0.3140  0.4303 
Within-group inequality  0.2083  0.2099  0.3238  0.2498  0.1997  0.2405  0.2601  0.2425  0.3607 
Contribution (%) (72.98)  (76.53)  (84.95)  (79.66)  (77.98)  (82.18)  (77.19)  (77.21)  (83.82) 
Between-group inequality  0.0772  0.0644  0.0574  0.0638  0.0564  0.0522  0.0769  0.0716  0.0696 
Contribution (%)  (27.02)  (23.48)  (15.05)  (20.34)  (22.02)  (17.82)  (22.81)  (22.79)  (16.18) 
Casual workers:                   
Overall wage inequality   0.1431  0.1585  0.2531  0.1524  0.1199  0.1287  0.117  0.1186  0.1424 
Within-group inequality  0.1200  0.1345  0.2278  0.1357  0.1028  0.1110  0.1015  0.1029  0.1262 
Contribution (%)  (83.83)  (84.88)  (90.00)  (89.06)  (85.72)  (86.28)  (86.71)  (86.72)  (88.64) 
Between-group inequality  0.0231  0.0240  0.0253  0.0166  0.0171  0.0177  0.0155  0.0158  0.0162 
Contribution (%)  (16.14)  (15.15)  (9.99)  (10.92)  (14.25)  (13.75)  (13.27)  (13.31)  (11.37) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the contribution (%) of each component to overall inequality. 
 
An  examination  of  the  within-industry  inequality  measures  (not  reported)  suggests  that 
inequality within almost all industries rose during the 1990s.
6 The exceptions are the mining, 
utilities and services industries, all of which are dominated by the public sector, which could 
explain the stability in wage inequality in these industries over this period of a decade and a 
                                                 
6  As  before,  these  trends  are  examined  using  the  95%  confidence  intervals  obtained  by  bootstrapping  (not 
reported).   14
half.
7 Galbraith et al. (2004) also find that rising manufacturing pay inequality during the 
1990s was driven primarily by rising incomes in heavy manufacturing industries.
8  
 
4. Accounting for inequality in a regression framework  
 
In contrast to examining within- and between-group inequality as described above several 
methods have been suggested to decompose the wage inequality into its components parts 
within a regression framework (see Fields (2002) for a review). While the earlier approaches 
rely  on  parsimonious  specifications  of  the  wage  functions  many  of  the  more  recent 
approaches are complicated and unwieldy. One exception is the methodology developed by 
Fields (2002) that decomposes the contribution of various explanatory variables to the level of 
and change in inequality  within a standard semi-logarithmic wage  (or income) regression 
model. The merit of this method is that it is independent of the measure of inequality chosen 




Assume a semi-logarithmic Mincerian (standard or augmented) wage determining function as 
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where ln(.) is the natural log operator, wi wages,  j b  coefficients and Zij the explanatory 
variables (j = 1,..J) for individual i (at time t) while  i e  is the random error term. This can be 
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where  a  =  [ ] 1 , ..... 1 J b b   and  Z  =  [ ] e , ...... 1 J Z Z   are  vectors  of  coefficients  and  explanatory 
variables respectively. An inequality index I can be defined on the vector of wages (w).  
 
                                                 
7 Services includes public administration - the largest employer of regular workers.  
8 Unlike this research, Galbraith et al. (2004) also document rising inequality in the electricity sector.    15
Fields  (2002)  then  applies  Shorrocks’  theorem  to  compute  the  relative  factor  inequality 
weights (i.e., the percentage of inequality that is accounted for by the j
th  factor) as follows:  
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where cov[.] denotes the covariance, cor(.) the correlation coefficient and  (.) s  the standard 
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  hold  for  any 
inequality index I(w) which is continuous and symmetric (including the Gini coefficient and 
the  Generalised  Entropy  measures)  and  for  which  I(e )  =  0.  The  fraction  of  inequality 
explained by the j
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The percentage contributions of factors to the change in inequality can be similarly computed. 
However this share is no longer independent of the inequality measure used as any change in 
inequality would depend on the measure used. The difference in the chosen inequality index 
between two time periods (0,1) can be written as follows: 
[ ] ￿ ´ - ´ = -
j
j j w I s w I s w I w I 0 0 , 1 1 , 0 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (                               (10) 
The contribution of the j
th factor to the change in equality between the two time periods (0,1) 
is given by:  
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4.2. The determinants of wages 
 
In the first step of the above regression-based decomposition methodology, separate wage 
equations are estimated for regular and casual workers with human capital, industry affiliation 
and various other characteristics as controls. Before the wage regression models are estimated   16
the issue of selection bias is addressed using the generalised framework popularised by Lee 
(1983).
9  Selection  is  modelled  as  a  polychotomous  outcome  between  three  employment 
categories – non-wage earners (including non-participants in the labour market, self-employed 
and unemployed individuals), regular wage workers and casual wage workers. As this bias is 
mediated through observed wages it is sufficient and computationally  more convenient to 
separate employment status into non-wage earners and two different types of wage earners. 
As noted in Section 2, the separation of workers based on the nature of employment is based 
on the notion of a dual economy. 
 
A two-stage model for selection and wage determination is estimated. First, a multinomial 





































   0 1 = g ; m = 2,3; k = 2,3       (12) 
where  the  vector  x  comprises  exogenous  explanatory  variables,  m  and  k  are  categorical 
variables  signifying  selection  between  the  different  employment  categories.  Exclusion 
restrictions are required to identify the parameters of the wage equations so that a set of 
variables that influence employment status between the alternative outcomes but not wage are 
included  as  regressors  in  the  selection  equation.  The  selection  bias  correction  term,  k l , 








l                     (13)      
where  (.) f  and  (.) F  represent the normal density and distribution functions respectively and 
Pk  is the probability of being in outcome k (k = 2, 3). 
 
An  augmented  semi-logarithmic  Mincerian  specification  can  then  be  used  to  estimate 
consistent coefficients of the wage equations  for both sets of workers (suppressing the sub-
scripts for time, t, and type of wage employment, k): 
                                                 
9 Selection bias could arise if the selection of individuals into wage employment is systematic. This is because 
this sample is essentially truncated as data on wages as well as industry affiliation is reported only for those 
individuals in wage employment.  
10 The MNL model is identified only up to an additive vector. As a result one set of parameters g s (outcome 
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where 
* b  is the coefficient on the selection bias correction term,  i l ˆ , and  i e  the random error 
terms such that  0 ) ; | ( = i i i x z E e .  
 
This two-step procedure controls for the underlying process by which the set of observations 
actually observed are  generated and ensures consistent estimates of the parameters of the 
wage equations.
11 The sampling distribution for the estimates can be obtained by using a 
modification to the formula suggested in Trost and Lee (1984) or by bootstrapping. The latter 
procedure  is  adopted  here  and  each  of  the  estimated  wage  regression  models  has  been 
bootstrapped  using  1000  replications.  The  selection  equations  are  not  reported  here  for 
brevity;  the  wage  equations  are  reported  in  Table  A2  of  the  Appendix.  The  explanatory 
variables common to both models are worker characteristics such as age, education, marital 
status, caste and religious affiliation as well as controls for settlement type, state of residence 
and seasonality effects. As noted earlier, the parameters of the wage equations are identified 
by including in the selection equation variables that capture household structure - household 
size  and  four  dependency  variables.
12  The  wage  regression  models  also  include  industry 
affiliation  dummy  variables  and  selection  bias  correction  terms  constructed  as  described 
above.  
 
The explanatory power of the variables in all three years is quite high – explaining over half 
and one-third of the variation in log wages for regular and casual workers respectively. The 
standard error of estimate is the dispersion of the predicted wages after controlling for various 
individual and other characteristics and has increased by about 10 and 2.5 percentage points 
for regular and casual workers respectively. Comparing this with the standard deviation of 
mean regular wages (reported in Table 1) suggests that while the change between 1983 and 
1993  is  comparable  for  both  statistics,  it  is  far  more  rapid  for  the  unadjusted  standard 
                                                 
11 The Lee correction was chosen over other methods of selection correction in polychotmous outcome models 
because of its simplicity, computational convenience and transparent interpretation of the selection effect. It 
should  be  noted  that  parameter  estimates  of  the  wage  equations  obtained  in  this  paper  using  power  series 
approximations for the selection term following the approach advocated by Newey (1999) were very similar to 
those obtained using the Lee correction. 
12 As the choice of identifying variables is necessarily ad hoc the MNL model was estimated for different 
specifications of identifying variables. The parameter estimates in the wage equations are not sensitive to the 
choice of the identifying variables and the coefficient on the correction term itself was not materially different 
across specifications. On balance, these instruments were also not found to strongly influence wages in most 
specifications in most years.    18
deviation. The standard deviation of casual wages was lower in 1993 compared to the first 
survey, but increased in 1999. The standard error of estimate, on the other hand, suggests 
rising inequality after adjusting for individual characteristics in both sub-periods, though less 
so during the 1990s. This rise in the standard error of estimates in the wage equations coupled 
with the growing importance of selection for regular workers suggests  an increase in the 
returns to unobservable skills that could possibly be related to the liberalisation process. 
 
The explanatory variables have the anticipated signs and the majority yield significant effects 
at the one per cent level or better. The industry dummy variables are almost all significant at 
the one per cent level or better indicating the presence of inter-industry wage differentials for 
both sets of workers. The differences in the returns to human capital embodied in experience 
and education for different types of workers are consistent with the notion of dual primary 
and  secondary  labour  markets.  Casual  workers  face  at  best  flat  returns  to  education  and 
experience  while  the  returns  to  education  for  regular  workers  are  positive  and  rising  in 
education level. This pattern of returns increasing in education level has been observed in 
several country studies for Africa and Asia (see Bennell (1995)), and in national and regional 
studies within India (Duraisamy, 2002; Kingdon, 1998).  
 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  1990s  were  a  period  of  rapid  industrial  deregulation  and  trade 
liberalisation in India. This considerable structural change over the space of a decade is likely 
to have had some implications for the labour market. This is reflected in the changes in the 
marginal effects of selected variables during the 1990s. In particular, the returns to graduate 
education for regular workers rose from 9 per cent to 10 per cent between 1993 and 1999 (t-
statistic = 2.33),
13  despite a rise in the supply of graduates. Various explanations for this rise 
include the existence of patterns of trade that increase the relative demand for skill, i.e., skill-
enhancing  trade  or  SET  (Robbins,  1996),  a  structure  of  trade  protection  that  formerly 
favoured relatively unskilled-labour intensive sectors (Harrison and Hanson, 1999), and skill-
biased  technological  change  (Lawrence  and  Slaughter,  1993).  This  rising  gap  between 
graduate and primary education among regular workers during the 1990s is reflected in the 
sharp  rise  in  wage  inequality  during  this  period.  The  contribution  of  these  explanatory 
variables, including education and industry affiliation, to wage inequality is examined next.  
                                                 
13 These are computed as the difference in the coefficients (obtained from the wage regression models) between 
two consecutive education levels divided by the difference in the years of schooling associated with each level. 
Standard errors (used in the t-tests for change over time) can also be computed.    19
 
4.3. Accounting for inequality in India: 1983, 1993 and 1999 
 
The decomposition methodology described above is applied to the wage regression models 
with one qualification. This approach can be used to examine the contribution of all variables 
including variables with non-linear effects and categorical variables entered as a string of 
dummy variables. A problem arises when there are two or more variables enter interactively 
as the underlying assumption in the decompositions is that the explanatory variables enter the 
wage  function  additively.  As  a  result  the  contribution  of  seasonality  and  settlement  type 
included in the wage regression models cannot be decomposed neatly and are presented as a 
composite effect. One merit of this approach is that it is possible to examine not only the 
statistical significance of explanatory variables in a regression but also the strength of their 
explanatory power. For instance, the wage regression models (see Table A2 of the Appendix) 
indicate that the majority of the explanatory variables are significant at the one per cent level 
or better. However, as Table 4 reveals, the contribution of these variables to wage inequality 
differs markedly.  
 
Table 4: Relative factor inequality shares 
   Regular workers  Casual workers 
Factors  1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Age  0.1019  0.1159  0.1338  0.0140  0.0193  0.0223 
  (18.63)  (24.13)  (25.20)  (4.10)  (6.28)  (6.57) 
Marital status  0.0145  0.0167  0.0189  0.0023  0.0038  0.0020 
  (2.65)  (3.47)  (3.55)  (0.68)  (1.24)  (0.58) 
Educational level  0.2313  0.1735  0.1722  0.0003  -0.0010  0.0048 
  (42.29)  (36.12)  (32.43)  (0.09)  -(0.34)  (1.42) 
Social and ethnic group  0.0071  0.0040  0.0036  0.0029  -0.0003  0.0019 
  (1.30)  (0.82)  (0.67)  (0.85)  -(0.11)  (0.57) 
Season and settlement type  0.0393  0.0018  0.0018  0.0428  0.0073  0.0099 
  (7.19)  (0.38)  (0.34)  (12.54)  (2.36)  (2.90) 
State of residence  0.0182  0.0130  0.0188  0.1798  0.1849  0.2112 
  (3.33)  (2.71)  (3.54)  (52.74)  (60.10)  (62.14) 
Industry affiliation  0.1222  0.1031  0.1385  0.0837  0.0879  0.0842 
  (22.35)  (21.45)  (26.07)  (24.55)  (28.57)  (24.77) 
Selection  0.0124  0.0524  0.0436  0.0152  0.0058  0.0035 
  (2.27)  (10.92)  (8.20)  (4.46)  (1.89)  (1.04) 
Residual  0.4530  0.5196  0.4689  0.6590  0.6923  0.6601 
R-squared  0.5470  0.4804  0.5311  0.3410  0.3077  0.3399 
Sample size        27,356       26,387       27,295  28,855  26,398  29,805   20
Note: Relative factor inequality shares refer to  )] [ln(w s j  in equation (8). Figures in parentheses are the share 
of inequality explained (i.e.,  )] [ln(w p j  in equation (9), multiplied by 100). 
 
The differences in the structure of inequality among the two groups of workers are striking. In 
terms of the explained component for regular workers human capital embodied in experience 
(proxied by age) and education plays an important role in any given year - age accounted for 
about a quarter and education for about one-third of the explained level of inequality in 1999. 
While  age  does  contribute  to  wage  inequality  among  casual  workers  the  relative  factor 
inequality share is much lower than that for regular workers - age accounts for only about five 
to seven percent of explained inequality. Geographic factors are the single most important 
factor in explaining inequality among casual workers – the state of residence variables explain 
between 50 per cent and 62 per cent of explained wage inequality in the three years. Industry 
affiliation plays an equally important role for both groups of workers accounting for about a 
quarter of explained wage inequality. 
 
Surveys of decomposition analyses in developing countries typically reveal that individual 
attributes  (such  as  education,  age,  gender,  household  composition)  account  for  large 
proportions  of  income  inequality  (Fields,  1980;  Litchfield,  2003).  There  is  a  growing 
literature  on  the  empirical  application  of  this  decomposition  methodology.  The  factor 
inequality  shares  for  regular  workers  are  somewhat  similar  to  other  studies  using  this 
accounting  methodology  though  the  countries  studied  are  vastly  different  –  Guatemala 
(Alejos, 2003), the Republic of Korea (Fields  and Yoo, 2000), Serbia (Krstic and Reilly, 
2003) and the United States (Fields, 2002), among others. Though the values of the factor 
inequality  shares  estimated  differ  somewhat  the  same  factors  play  an  important  role  in 
explaining  inequality  –  education,  experience  and  occupation.  Alejos  (2003)  found  that 
education  (11%),  experience  (3%),  occupation  (24%)  and  ethnicity  (3%)  were  the  major 
factors  explaining  inequality  in  Guatemala  among  male  workers.  Fields  and  Yoo  (2000) 
found that, among others, four factors – job tenure (24-38%), occupation (20-21%), education 
(13-26%)  and  potential  experience  (13-14%)  -  were  the  major  contributors  to  inequality 
among male workers in both the  years examined though there were some rank reversals. 
Industry  affiliation  explained  about  3-6%  of  explained  inequality.  Fields  (2002)  obtains 
estimates comparable to this research for the United States for experience (26%) but find a 
greater role for education (46%) and occupation (26%) than for industry affiliation in 1999. 
Krstic and Reilly (2003) also find that education contributed (32-40%) significantly to wage   21
inequality in Serbia during the 1990s but find a much lower role played by labour force 
experience (3-4%). The contribution of industry affiliation to inequality is comparable to the 
estimates in this research though those for Serbia are more volatile – ranging from 9% in 2000 
to 33% in 1997. It should be noted that estimates from the Krstic and Reilly study include 
male and female workers while those from Alejos, Fields and Yoo, Fields and this research 
refer to male workers only. Other than this research, none of the other studies control for 
selection.  The  contribution  of  industry  affiliation  to  wage  inequality  in  India  is  also 
highlighted by  Galbraith et al. (2004) - they find that inequality in manufacturing pay is 
driven  by  between-industry  (and  within-state)  inequality  rather  than  between-state  (and 
within-industry) inequality.  
 
Alejos (2003) also decomposed wage inequality among different sub-groups of workers. In 
particular,  he  found  that  the  contribution  of  education  to  inequality  among  agricultural, 
livestock and fishery workers was much lower at about three per cent compared to inequality 
among all workers. As casual workers are predominantly engaged in agricultural and allied 
activities this supports the findings of a low factor inequality share for education in this paper 
for  casual  workers.  This  suggests  that  there  is  equality  of  educational  attainment  among 
casual  workers  –  supported  also  by  the  low  between-education  group  share  of  explained 
inequality. This equality, however, is a result not of high enrolment rates but of low average 
level of schooling among these workers. This is unsurprising as, by definition, casual workers 
compete in a secondary labour market with virtually flat returns to education, indicating either 
that there is a low demand for skill or that the acquired skills are not useful in the casual 
labour market.  
 
The relative role of the factors determining wages has changed somewhat over time. Though 
the wage gap between regular workers with graduate and primary school qualifications has 
risen between 1983 and 1999, the factor inequality weight of education has fallen during this 
period. For casual workers, on the other hand, the contribution of education, though small, 
rose between 1983 and 1999. At the same time the contribution of age has risen for both 
workers, which is also reflected in the steepening of the age-earnings profile (see Table A2 of 
the Appendix). The increase in the contribution of selection coupled with the fall in that of 
education  suggests  a  rising  importance  for  unobservable  skill  in  the  probability  of 
employment in regular wage employment that is possibly linked to the process of trade and 
industrial liberalisation. The contribution of selection into casual wage employment declined   22
during this period. The fall in the importance of season and settlement variables for both 
workers  is  driven  primarily  by  the  decrease  in  the  negative  effect  on  individual  wages 
associated with residing in rural areas. The relative importance of variables capturing caste 
and religious affiliation is quite low and has also halved during this period. The contribution 
of industry affiliation towards wage inequality among regular workers rose between 1983 and 
1999, possibly reflecting the change in the structure of protection across industries that was a 
consequence of the trade liberalisation during this period. In particular, there was substantial 
reductions in both the level and dispersion of tariff and non-tariff barriers that altered the 
structure of protection across industries. The data suggest that industries with high initial 
levels of tariff protection (in 1983) had low wages relative to the economy average and a high 
share  of  unskilled  regular  workers.  These  industries  were  also  those  that  experienced  the 
greatest  reductions  in  tariff  protection.  There  is  some  evidence  that  the  wages  of  regular 
workers (predominantly unskilled) in these manufacturing industries fell relative to those in 
more skill-intensive industries (Vasudeva-Dutta, 2004). This would explain the rise in the 
contribution of industry affiliation to the level of inequality between 1983 and 1999 for these 
workers. There is an increase in the factor share of industry affiliation for casual workers in 
1993.  However,  it  is  less  likely  that  this  would  have  been  influenced  by  the  trade  and 
industrial reforms as relative demand shifts are less likely to matter for casual workers who, 
by definition, comprise a largely homogenous pool of labour.  
 
4.4. Accounting for changes in inequality in India: 1983 to 1999 
 
For regular workers wage inequality trends indicate rising inequality at least during the 1990s. 
The picture is less clear between 1983 and 1993 and the trends depend on the measure of 
inequality used. The Gini coefficient was stable between 1983 and 1993 (this implies a very 
small  denominator  in  terms  of  equation  (11)  resulting  in  improbably  large  estimates  of 
(.) j P ), the Theil index fell during this period while the inter-quantile range rose. For casual 
workers though there is some disagreement about trends depending on the inequality measure 
used but the overall picture is one of declining inequality. The contribution of the explanatory 
factors  to  the  changes  in  inequality  between  1983  and  1999  is  reported  in  Table  5.  The 
inequality measures used are the Gini coefficient, Theil index and the inter-quantile range 
between the 90
th and 10
th percentile (IQR). A factor increases (decreases) inequality if the   23
sign of the factor share is the same (opposite) as the direction of change in the inequality 
measure.  
 
Table 5: Contribution of factors to changes in wage inequality, 1983-1999 
   Regular workers  Casual workers 
Factors  Gini  Theil  IQR  Gini  Theil  IQR  
Age  0.4881  0.3543  0.1629  -0.0610  -0.0108  0.0380 
Marital status  0.0671  0.0489  0.0228  0.0052  0.0033  0.0014 
Educational level  -0.4828  -0.2354  0.1185  -0.0403  -0.0131  0.0133 
Social and ethnic group  -0.0358  -0.0209  0.0004  0.0116  0.0058  0.0001 
Season and settlement type  -0.4141  -0.2570  -0.0323  0.3389  0.1405  -0.0521 
State of residence  0.0253  0.0228  0.0193  -0.1027  0.0865  0.2704 
Industry affiliation  0.3182  0.2503  0.1532  0.0793  0.0823  0.0851 
Selection  0.3889  0.2584  0.0719  0.1202  0.0499  -0.0185 
Residual  0.6451  0.5785  0.4834  0.6488  0.6556  0.6623 
Note: IQR refers to the inter-quantile range between the 90
th and 10
th percentiles for real hourly wages. The 
contribution of factors refers to  (.) j P in equation (11).  
 
As  regular  wage  inequality  increased  between  1983  and  1999  a  positive  (negative)  sign 
denotes that a factor was responsible for widening (narrowing) inequality. The majority of 
factors  contribute  towards  increasing  wage  inequality  during  this  period.  Age,  industry 
affiliation and selection are consistently the most important sources of widening inequality 
while education serves to narrow inequality among regular workers. The adverse impact of 
industry  affiliation  on  wage  inequality  is,  to  some  extent  at  least,  a  consequence  of  the 
differential impact of the fall in tariff protection across industries. For casual workers there is 
some disagreement among the different inequality measures - the inter-quantile range rose 
while the Gini coefficient and Theil index fell between 1983 and 1999. As a result, a positive 
sign denotes widening inequality for the first measure and narrowing inequality for the latter 
two measures. While age and education contribute towards widening inequality among casual 
workers, selection narrows inequality during this period. The role of industry affiliation and 
geographic location depends on the measure used – the former serves to widen inequality 
using the inter-quantile range and vice-versa using the Gini and the Theil while the latter 
serves to widen inequality using the IQR and Gini but not the Theil. There is considerable 
evidence of wide inter-state disparities in economic growth, poverty incidence and income 
inequality especially in the post-liberalisation period (see, for example, Sachs et al. (2002) 
and  Deaton  and  Dreze  (2002)).  As  geographic  location  is  the  single  most  important   24
determinant of the level of wage inequality it would be an interesting topic for future research 




This paper examines the structure of wage inequality for different types of adult male workers 
– those with regular wage or salaried jobs and those with casual or contractual jobs – using 
the notion of a dual labour market. The analysis uses microeconomic data for three years - 
1983, 1993 and 1999 - spanning a period of rapid economic liberalisation in India.  
 
The major finding of this paper is that there are striking differences in the evolution and 
structure of wage inequality for the two groups of workers. Wage inequality among regular 
workers is not only considerably higher than that among casual workers it has also risen 
between 1983 and 1999, particularly during the 1990s. Though there is some disagreement 
among the different inequality measures, inequality among casual workers has fallen during 
this period. This highlights the importance of examining these workers separately rather than 
as one category. Simple decompositions of wage inequality by education and industry groups 
reveal that the major portion, particularly for casual workers, is accounted for by inequality 
among individuals within rather than between these groups.  
 
The contribution of the various factors generally used to explain wages also differs for these 
workers.  Human  capital  (as  embodied  in  age  and  education)  is  one  of  the  major  factors 
explaining  both  the  level  of  and  change  in  regular  wage  inequality.  For  casual  workers 
geographic location plays the most important role in determining wage inequality. Industry 
affiliation, on the other hand, plays an equally important role explaining about a quarter of 
wage inequality for both groups of workers. Age, education, industry affiliation and selection 
are also consistently the most important contributors to changes in inequality among both sets 
of  workers,  though  their  directional  effect  differ  somewhat.  The  role  of  education  in 
accounting for wage inequality must be stressed. While educational attainment is an important 
contributor towards the level of wage inequality its factor inequality share has fallen by about 
ten  percentage  points  between  1983  and  1999  and  education  has  contributed  towards 
narrowing wage inequality during this period despite the rising skill premium for graduates. 
At the same time the supply of educated workers increased at all levels of education. For 
casual workers education serves to widen inequality but only a very small proportion of these   25
workers is educated beyond primary school. This suggests that expanding education through 
greater access would be a desirable strategy to reduce disparities.  
 
To the author’s knowledge this paper is among the first to comprehensively document the 
evolution and structure of wage inequality in India. This study also augments the growing 
literature on the empirical application of a regression-based decomposition technique in order 
to examine the significance and contribution of various factors to wage inequality. The study 
of inequality  and its determinants is important in itself and labour market inequality is  a 
significant determinant of disparities in living standards. In addition, disparities in wages and 
incomes also have implications for poverty and growth. Ravallion (1997) finds that initial 
inequality  has  important  implications  for  poverty  reduction  by  influencing  how  poverty 
responds to growth. There is also growing literature on how high levels of inequality hinder 
growth  through  political  economy  arguments  imperfect  asset  markets,  and  social  conflict 
(Benabou, 1996). Though this study is essentially an accounting exercise, by examining in 
detail the structure of wage inequality for different sets of workers the empirical analysis 
reported  sets  the  stage  for  the  future  investigation  of  the  reasons  for  the  change  in  the 
underlying  factors. This agenda for future research could fruitfully focus on the role that 
returns to education or industry affiliation exert on the change in wage inequality over this 
period. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
The three large-scale nationally representative employment surveys for January-December 1983, July 1993–June 
1994 and July 1999–June 2000 (referred to as 1983, 1993 and 1999 in the paper) are a rich source of data on 
wages, employment and individual and household characteristics. The final sample generated for use in the 
empirical analysis comprises data from 17 states – Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, 
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Taken together these 17 states accounted for about 96% of total gross state 
domestic product and 97% of total population in 1999-2000 (see also Özler et al. (1996)). Individuals were 
divided into three mutually exclusive categories using current weekly status: (i) non-wage earners, i.e., non-
participants in the labour market, self-employed and unemployed individuals (ii) regular wage employment and (iii) 
casual wage employment.  
Wages 
Nominal weekly wages include payment in cash and kind. Some observations (about 1-2% in the three years) had 
to  be  dropped  from  the  sample  as  there  were  missing  observations  on  wages,  hours  worked  and  industry 
affiliation. It is assumed that the excluded observations are random as the mean observable characteristics of the 
workers excluded do not differ significantly from those retained in the sample though this does not take possible 
differences in unobservables  into account. The wage distribution was then trimmed by 0.1% at the top and 
bottom tails. This is necessarily an ad hoc measure: some researchers prefer to trim the wage distribution using 
specific values  (Krueger and Summers, 1988) while others prefer to trim the distribution at the tails (Arbache et 
al., 2004) as adopted here. These nominal wages were deflated to 1983 prices using official state-level monthly 
consumer price indices (base year 1960-61) for agricultural labourers (CPIAL) for rural wages and industrial 
workers (CPIIW) for urban wages (Labour Bureau, various years). Using the survey data on the intensity of 
work – i.e., no work, part-time or full-time – for each day of the week and assuming a 48 hour week, the number 
of hours worked and the real hourly wage was constructed.  
Variables influencing wages 
The standard quadratic form for age is not used as this did not fit the data well and following Murphy and Welch 
(1990) age splines at ten-year intervals were included instead as a proxy for labour force experience. Marital 
status is a dummy variable coded one if currently married and zero if never married, widowed, divorced or 
separated. There is information on the highest level of schooling completed (but not on the number of years of 
schooling) so dummy variables corresponding to the following education variables were constructed: primary 
school, middle school, secondary school and graduate and above. The reference category is individuals who are 
illiterate or have less than two years of formal or informal schooling. Dummy variables for caste and religious 
affiliation  were  constructed  from  household  data;  the  omitted  category  is  all  other  households.  Seasonality 
effects  are  captured  by  dummy  variables  for  the  quarter  in  which  the  households  were  interviewed.  These 
quarterly dummies were also interacted with the dummy variable for the rural sector. The variable for industry 
affiliation was constructed based on the individual’s current weekly industrial classification. In order to ensure 
adequate observations in each industry the three-digit National Industrial Classification codes are aggregated into 
38 industries.    29
APPENDIX 
Table A1: Inequality measures, real weekly wages  
   Regular workers  Casual workers 
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Mean real weekly wage (Rs.)  141.479  206.81  267.03  45.02  62.02  74.19 
  (112.27)  (153.18)  (220.34)  (31.66)  (34.30)  (42.20) 
Median real weekly wage (Rs.)  121.98  173.66  210.29  38.39  56.43  66.34 
Wage inequality measures:           
Inter-quantile range (90-10)  219.0349  350.5498  479.0380  58.4178  79.0688  91.1097 
Standard error  (1.7247)  (1.7967)  (3.0404)  (0.6075)  (0.6407)  (0.7045) 












Inter-quantile range (90-50)  133.6018  229.3618  331.0612  37.8083  48.6347  56.6144 
Standard error  (1.6131)  (1.7101)  (3.0191)  (0.5647)  (0.6103)  (0.6648) 












Inter-quantile range (50-10)  85.4331  121.1880  147.9768  20.6096  30.4341  34.4953 
Standard error  (0.7536)  (0.8505)  (1.5734)  (0.1853)  (0.2393)  (0.2704) 












Gini coefficient  0.3791  0.3881  0.4210  0.3235  0.2919  0.2896 
Standard error  (0.0020)  (0.0016)  (0.0015)  (0.0019)  (0.0013)  (0.0013) 












Mean log deviation, GE(0)  0.2684  0.3103  0.3268  0.1863  0.1829  0.1461 
Standard error  (0.0027)  (0.0032)  (0.0024)  (0.0022)  (0.0025)  (0.0014) 












Theil index, GE(1)  0.2477  0.2488  0.2918  0.1852  0.1440  0.1409 
Standard error  (0.0034)  (0.0021)  (0.0023)  (0.0032)  (0.0014)  (0.0015) 












Half squared coeff. variation, GE(2)  0.3149  0.2743  0.3404  0.2473  0.1529  0.1618 
Standard error  (0.0088)  (0.0031)  (0.0039)  (0.0091)  (0.0018)  (0.0024) 












Sample size  27,356  26,387  27,295  28,855  26,398  29,805 
Note: Real weekly wage (Rs.) in constant 1983 prices. The inequality measures are computed without applying 
household weights. Figures in parentheses are as labelled - standard deviation for the mean wage, standard errors 
and 95% confidence intervals for inequality measures obtained by bootstrapping with 1000 replications. 
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Table A2: Wage regression models for regular and casual workers 
Dependent variable: Natural log of real hourly wages 
   Regular wage workers  Casual wage workers 
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Individual characteristics:             
Education:             
Completed primary school  0.0658***  0.0426***  0.0485***  0.0088  0.0108*  0.0227*** 
  (0.0072)  (0.0100)  (0.0114)  (0.0057)  (0.0057)  (0.0056) 
Completed middle school  0.1361***  0.0933***  0.1090***  -0.0065  -0.0079  0.0165* 
  (0.0085)  (0.0120)  (0.0115)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0085) 
Completed secondary school  0.3486***  0.2640***  0.2945***  -0.0085  -0.0348**  0.0117 
  (0.0110)  (0.0160)  (0.0140)  (0.0174)  (0.0154)  (0.0147) 
Completed graduate school  0.6192***  0.5385***  0.6025***  -0.0043  -0.0693*  0.0180 
  (0.0150)  (0.0229)  (0.0188)  (0.0540)  (0.0381)  (0.0318) 
Experience:
1             
Age spline: 15-25 years  0.0139***  0.0106***  0.0130***  0.0106***  0.0136***  0.0137*** 
  (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0022)  (0.0007)  (0.0009)  (0.0010) 
Age spline: 25-35 years  0.0174***  0.0165***  0.0203***  -0.0008  -0.0009  0.0019*** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 
Age spline: 35-45 years  0.0106***  0.0158***  0.0160***  -0.0015**  -0.0003  -0.0007 
  (0.0008)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0006) 
Age spline: 45-55 years  0.0055***  0.0129***  0.0159***  -0.0007  -0.0043***  -0.0033*** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0009) 
Age spline: 55-65 years  -0.0291***  -0.0304***  -0.0252***  -0.0052***  -0.0053***  -0.0034** 
  (0.0031)  (0.0049)  (0.0046)  (0.0013)  (0.0015)  (0.0014) 
Others:             
Married  0.0647***  0.0781***  0.0878***  0.0271***  0.0327***  0.0196*** 
  (0.0073)  (0.0095)  (0.0102)  (0.0037)  (0.0045)  (0.0043) 
Member of scheduled caste
  -0.0472***  -0.0389***  -0.0309***  -0.0033  0.0111*  -0.0060 
              or tribe 
2  (0.0056)  (0.0074)  (0.0072)  (0.0051)  (0.0060)  (0.0059) 
Muslim  -0.0163**  -0.0328***  -0.0436***  0.0249***  0.0245***  0.0130** 
  (0.0075)  (0.0093)  (0.0092)  (0.0049)  (0.0055)  (0.0053) 
Residence in rural areas  -0.1454***  -0.0468**  -0.0240  -0.0972***  -0.0479***  -0.0329*** 
  (0.0141)  (0.0207)  (0.0166)  (0.0082)  (0.0079)  (0.0076) 
Selection bias correction term  -0.0202  -0.1152***  -0.1149***  0.0610***  0.0682***  0.0391*** 
  (0.0174)  (0.0270)  (0.0228)  (0.0125)  (0.0129)  (0.0145) 
Selection effect 
3  0.0231  0.1281***  0.1336***  -0.0726***  -0.0781***  -0.0448*** 
  (0.0228)  (0.0334)  (0.0308)  (0.0177)  (0.0169)  (0.0190) 
Constant  0.4375***  0.6996***  0.8532***  0.4263***  0.4483***  0.5710*** 
  (0.0579)  (0.0917)  (0.0846)  (0.0279)  (0.0324)  (0.0352) 
Number of observations   27,356   26,387   27,295   28,855   26,398   29,805  
Adjusted R
2  0.5458  0.4789  0.5298  0.3393  0.3058  0.3382 
Standard error of estimate  0.3483  0.4229  0.4477  0.2127  0.2318  0.2364 
Notes: a/ Standard errors in parentheses (obtained after bootstrapping with 1000 replications). b/ * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. c/ Also included but not reported - six seasonality dummy 
variables including interactions of the season and settlement type (the first season (January-March) and the 
interaction with the rural dummy are the omitted categories); 37 industry dummy variables are included (five 
agricultural and allied industries, two mining, 21 manufacturing and eight non-tradable industries); food crops is 
the omitted industry; 16 state dummies (West Bengal is the omitted state).  
1/  The  estimated  coefficients  on  the  age  splines  are  not  cumulative.  2/  These  terms  are  derived  from  the 
schedules of the Constitution Orders passed in 1950 that listed the names of specific castes and tribes eligible for 
special  treatment  from  the  State  in  terms  of  reservations  in  public  sector  employment,  legislatures  and 
government-funded educational institutions (Das, 2003). 3/ The selection effect is computed as the coefficient on 
the  selection  bias  correction  term  times  its  mean  for  the  nominated  outcome  -  regular  or  casual  wage 
employment - multiplied by 100. A crude estimate of the standard error of the selection effect is obtained as   31
follows:  the  square  of  the  average  selection  bias  correction  term  times  the  standard  error  of  its  estimated 
coefficient (Reilly, 1990). 
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